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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE PEARCE,

••

Plaintiff-Appellant,

••

vs.

••

MARTIN J. WISTISEN and
RICHARD OVESON,

Case No. 18,376

••

Defendants-Respondents.

.•

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a wrongful death action by Wayne Pearce, the father
of the deceased, Evan Pearce, against the defendants Martin J.
Wistisen and Richard Oveson, for damages arising from the wrongful death of Evan Pearce during a boating excursion on Utah Lake.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen
with a jury, on the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th days of December,
1981.

The jury delivered a special verdict on December 10, 1981.

(R. at 194.)

On December 23, 1981, in accordance with the verdict

of the jury, the court ordered that plaintiff recover nothing
from defendants, and that defendants recover of plaintiff their
costs.

(R. at 207.)

Plaintiff filed his motion for a new trial on December 17,
1981.

(R. at 206.)

The court denied plaintiff's motion for a

new trial by its order filed March 26, 1982.
notice of appeal was filed on April 15, 1982.

(R. at 234.)
(R. at 240.)
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A

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant requests that this Court reverse the lower
court's decision and remand on the issue of damages, or, in the
alternative, remand the case for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff in this case is the father of the deceased, Evan
Pearce.

The plaintiff is suing for and on behalf of the heirs of

Evan Pearce.

Evan Pearce drowned in Utah Lake sometime between

7:00 p.m., June 1, 1979 and 5:00 a.m., June 2, 1979.
At the time of his death Evan Pearce had just graduated from
Timpview High School in Provo, Utah.

The incidents which led to

his untimely death occurred the day after his high school graduation ceremony.
Evan was in excellent health and was in extremely good
physical condition at the time of the accident which claimed his
life.

He was an accomplished tennis player and was at times

nationally ranked in his age group.

(R. at 490.)

Evan was the oldest of the three children in the Pearce
family. He had a very close relationship with his younger brother
and sister.

(R. at 376.)

He competed in doubles tennis with

both his younger brother and sister and was an invaluable training partner and assistant for them.

(R. at 377.)

He and his

family traveled extensively in connection with their athletic
activities.

This resulted in a close and confiding relationship

between the deceased and his parents.

(R. at 378.)

The incidents which caused Evan's drowning occurred during a
boating excursion on Utah Lake.

Evan Pearce and Kevin Wistisen,

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the minor child of defendant Martin J. Wistisen, formulated plans
for the boating trip while returning from a graduation party that
had been held in Provo Canyon on June 1, 1979. (R. at 405.)
On the morning of the accident, Evan Pearce was in a good
mental and physical state.

Testimony at trial indicated that he

was not tired and was not debilitated either mentally or physically; that he felt strong and eager for the days activities.

(R. at 402-403, 527-528.)
With both counsel present in chambers, counsel for plaintiff
made a motion in limine as to any reference to Evan's consumption of alcohol on the night and early morning preceding the
evening of the drowning.

(R. at 263.)

Plaintiff was not informed

of the defendants' intention to introduce such testimony or the
identity of the witness who would so testify until the Friday
(June 4) preceding the Monday (June 7) when the trial commenced.
Plaintiff's argument in support of the motion in limine was that
any consumption of alcohol which may have occurred was remote in
time, irrelevant, and that its sole purpose was to inflame and
prejudice the jury.

Additionally, it was argued that the testi-

mony was an unfair surprise.

(R. at 263-264.)

The court ruled

against plaintiff's motion in limine and conceded that "it may be
error, Mr. Howard, but I have ruled."

(R. at 264.)

Counsel for

the defendant admitted that neither he, nor the witness who was
to testify about the drinking, knew how much alcohol was in Evan
Pearce's system, if any, and that there was no way of determining
it.

(R. at 258.)
The defendants did introduce testimony at trial to the

-3-
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effect that Evan had been involved to some degree, in drinkin6
beer at the graduation party which hdd ended more than twelve
hours prior to the events in question.

(R. at 545, 548.)

Counsel

for plaintiff made a timely objection that the testimony was
irrelevant, immaterial and that any probative value was outweighed
by its prejudicial nature.

(R. at 545.)

The plaintiff in order to rebut the prejudicial testimony,
was forced to introduce evidence that the plainff's consumption
of alcohol was limited and that the time of last consumption was
(R. at 401,

not later than 5:30 a.m. the day of the accident.

402.)

This was more than thirteen hours prior to the time of the

beginning of the events leading to the fatality.

(l{. at 336.)

The boat in question was owned jointly by the defendants.

(R. at 311, 642.)

Each defendant testified that he had a 50%

ownership in the boat and that botil defendants and their families
shared in its use.

Mr. Wistisen gave permission for Kevin Wistisen

to take the boat on the day of the accident.

(R. at 405.)

Testimony of experts at trial indicated tnat the following
equipment is required to be kept in a boat the size of the one
involved in the accident:

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

One life jacket per person of proper size
so it can be worn effectively.
One ring buoy or throwable device.
Running lights on the boat.
An oar or paddle.
A horn.

These are the items, the lack of which would result in the issuance
of a citation.

(R. at 451-45), 459.)

Prior to leaving his house with the boat, Kevin

~vistisen

"cleaned U.iJ" the buat by removing equiiJment such as paddles and
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life preservers.

(~. at

407, 436.)

Testimony at trial e~taolished

that when the boat was on the water at the time of th~ erner 6 ency
it did not have the followiu6 statutorily required items:

1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

Paddles or oars.
Sufficient life jackets for the number of
people aboard the boat.
A ring buoy or throwable device.
Functional lights. (Kevin Wistisen had
cut off all electrical power in the boat
before leaving it, and had failed to 6ive
the girls remaining on board any instructions as how to make the lights functional.)
It is disputed as to whether a horn was
present on board.

(R. at 368-375, 343, 407, 409.)
An anchor is statutorily required when a boat is unbeachable.
There was some difference of opinion on the issue of the beachability
of the boat in question, with one expert indicating that in
windstorm, the boat would not be beachaole on Utai1 Lake.

a

This

would mean that without an anchor, the boat was subject to being
cited for the lack of an anchor on board.

(R. at 468.)

The

experts who were not of the opinion that the lack of an anchor
would subject the boat operator to a citation, were in agreement
that it would be an "essential" piece of equipment on a boat of
that size.

(R. at 477, 612.)

Tile experts also testified that a

safety flare, which the boat in question did not have at the time
of the accident, was "essential", although not required by statute.
(R. at 609.)

In the early afternoon of July 1, 1979, Kevin Wistisen
~icked

up Evan Pearce, Leslie Pearce, and Angela Adams who were

the other participants in the activity.

They proceeded to the

Pruvo Boat Harbor and launched the boat at C:iJ:Jf>roximately 5:UO

p.m.

(R. at 406.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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grou~

The

proceeded in the boat to the west side of Utah

Lake and botl1 Evan Pearce and Leslie Pearce waterskied.

364.) The

6rou~

(R. at

stayed on the west side of the lake until early

evening at which time they started back to the boat harbor with
(R. at 365.)

Evan Pearce skiing behind the boat.

By this time a wind had come up and the water had become
chop~y.

4uite

Evan fell after hitting some lar 6 e waves.

(R. at

366.) After Evan fell, Kevin Wistisen turned the boat to the left
and ran over the ski rope while rnakint; the turn to retrieve t:van
Pearce from the water.

(R. at 346, 366.)

Expert testimony at

trial established that regulations exist which require the operator
of a boat to approach a fallen waterskier from tne driver's side
of the boat.
right.

The driver's side of the boat in question is on Lhe

(R. at 473.)

Both Angela Adams and Leslie Pearce testi-

fied that Kevin Wistisen turned the boat to the left, not to the
driver's side, to pick up Evan Pearce.
violation of the regulation.
rope but denied making an

This would constitute a

Defendant admitted runnin6 over the

im~roper

turn.

Running over the rope in this manner caused it to become
entangled in the propeller and prevented the en6ine from operating.
(R. at 366.)

Kevin Wistisen raised tne outdrive and attempted to

untangle the rope from the propeller.

(R. at

36u.)

He was

unable to do so from inside the boat, so he lifted tne en6ine
cowl and switched off all electrical power in tlle boat, put on a
life jacket, and without t:;iving any instructions to the two girls
as to the operation of the boat or location of any emer 0 ency
equipment in the boat, he entered the water to

-6-

attem~t
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to remove

the tangled rope.

(R. at 367-368.)

Heither of the 5irls in tue

boat had any previous experience or instruction in the operation
of a boat, nor wer~ they adequately pret>ared to haudie tne emergency which developed.

(R. at 330.)

While these events transpired Evan Pearce was still in the
middle of the lake three miles from closet shore.

The boat was

(R. 427.)

approximately two miles from the closet shore.

Because

of the strong wind which had developed that afternoon, the boat
was being blown away from Evan.

(R. at 409.) Evan tried to swim

to the boat, but was impeded by the lite jacket he was wearin 6 .
In an effort to get to the boat before it became completely
unreachable, Evan took off his life jacket and tried to swim to
the boat.

(R. at

36~.)

Because of the rate at which the boat

was being driven by the wind, Evan was unsuccessful in his atternj:>t
to reach the boat.

(R. at ]b8.)

The two

b

·irls who were still in

the boat, Leslie Pearce and Ant:>eia Adams, informed Kevin Wistisen
of Evan's plight.

Kevin then swam back toward Evan while holdin6

onto the ski rope that trailed out behind the boat.

(R. at 369.)

While Kevin was holding the end of the rope and reaching for
Evan, the rope broke leaving both boys stranded in the lake.
Kevin made an attempt to swim to the boat, but because of the
wind he was unable to reach the boat.
swam back to where Evan was.

(R. at 370.)

Evan yelled to the

boat asking them to throw him a life jacket.
tiecause the boat was not properly

equi~ped,

Kevin then

~irls

in the

(R. at 370-371.)
in that it had only

three life jackets for four peuple, th-:re was only one jacket
remaining in the boat.

(R. at 407.)

Leslie Pearce then threw
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out the only remaining jacket to Evan and he was a.ble to reac11
it. The jacket that was thrown out was the blue Jacket that was
not large enough to fit a person of Evan's size and Evan was,
therefore, unable to zip it up the front even though he did put
(R. at 411, 426.)

it on.

The jacket, therefore, was open in

the front by four or five inches and supported tl1e body only in
the shoulders and the back.

Because the jacket was too small

and would not zip ut, it forced the user to wear it in such a
precarious way that it subjected him to the possibility of
slipping out of, or though it.
The boat was by now some distance from the boys in the
water, and the boys were unable to comillunicate to the 6irls any
instructions as to the operdtion of the boat.

(R. at 371.)

boat at this time was in about nine to ten feet of water.
at 442.)

Tne
(R.

The girls looked for an anchor to stop the boat from

drifting.

They also searched for a paddle witll which to manuever

tne boat.

(R. at 37l.)

at 372, 4-7.)

No such equipment was on the boat.

(R.

The boat continued to drift until it was com.t:Jletely

separated both visually and audibly from the boys stranded in the
water.

(R. at 673.)

The boys decided to swim to the west shore.

(R. at 426.)

Although this was the closet shore, they were still several miles
out.

(R. at 427.)

After it became dark the boys were separated

and that was the last time Evan Pearce was seen alive.

(R. at

415, 427.)
Kevin Wistisen was able to reach the shore almost five hours
later and phoned his home to inform hts

parent~

of the incident.
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(R. at 414.)

A Utah Cuunty Sheriff then Ccilile and picked .Keviu

Wistisen up on the west snore and took him back to the Provu
Harbor where his family. and others were waitin·-·.
0

~oat

(R. at 415. )

During this same evening the families of the

youn 6 ster~

in

the boat became worried and went to the boat harbor tu investigate.
The truck and boat trailer driven by Kevin Wistisen were there,
it was now dark and the boat had not returned.

Another boat with

Wayne Pearce, Evan Pearce's fatner, went out to search.

They

found nothing and returned to the boat harbor to learn that Kevin
Wistisen had been found.

(R. at 495.)

At this time the sheriffs

department actively joined in the search.

(R. at 496.)

It was

not until the next morning at approximately 5:00 a.rn. that the
boat with the two girls was found.

(R. at 376, 499.)

The two

girls, although extremely cold and frightened, were otherwise
safe when picked up by the boat from the De.tJartrnent of Parks and
Recreation.

A helicopter search that same morning resulted in

the location of the two life jackets, the yellow one Evan Pearce
had on when he was waterskiing, and the blue one he was
that did not fit and would not zip up.

(R. at 499.)

thro~1

When the

blue life jacket was found the certainty of the younb man's fate
became a reality for his parents and those conductint; the search.
Search efforts continued throughout the week, but the remains
of Evan Pearce were not found until approximately eight days
later.

(R. at 499.)

At the close of evidence, counsel for plaintiff made a
motion for a directed verdict in regard to liability or ne6lj_5ence
on the grounds that:
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1.

2.

3.

Defendants' negligence had been established by clear and convincint; evidence,
or in the alternative;
That defendants were negligent as a
matter of law and that such ne6ligence
was the proximate cause of the death of
the decedent, or in the alternative;
That defendants were negligent as a
matter of law and that the case should
be submitted to the jury on the issue of
whether such negligence was the proximate
cause of the death of the decedent.

(R. at 660-662.)

The court denied plaintiff's motion.

(R. at

6 70.)
Plaintiff objected to and took exceptions to the Jury instructions given by the court as follows:
1.

2.
3.

4.

The instructions did not adequately
instruct the jury as to the theory of the
plaintiff's case.
Instruction 10 refers to life expectancy,
and the court did not bive the jury a
life expectancy instruction.
Instruction numb~r 11 is error because it
refers to a reasonable discount witnout
considering inflationary rates.
Instruction 12 is error because it is a
double instruction in that it gives
double emphasis to defendants' theory of
the litigation.

(R. at 673-674.)
Plaintiff objected to the failure of the court to give his
requested instruction 19 on damabes.

(R. at 675.)

Plaintiff

also objected to the failure of the court to give the requested
instruction 1, regarding plaintiff's theory of the case, instruction 6, regarding the statutory liability of one who owns a boat
and entrusts it to a minor; instruction 7, regarding the statutory
duty of the owner of a motorboat to equip it with certain minimum
safety devices; and instruction 13, re(:)ardinb the presumption
that the deceased was exercising due care for his safety.
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(R.

at 675-676.)
Plaintiff objected to the verdict form because it submitted
the question of damages in a general way and not as to each of

(R. at 674-67S.)

the heirs.

ARGUMEd'f

POINT I
THE COURT'S FAILUR~ TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTKUCTiur~
NUMBER 6 ON IMPUTED LIABILITY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §73-18-18 WAS
ERROR.

In the present case, the only defendants were the joint
owners of a motorboat which was being driven and which was under
the control of the minor son of one of the defendants.

Plaiutiff's

theory of the case was that the defendants were vicariously
liable for the negligence of the minor who operated the boat with
the consent of the owner.

The only way that the 2laintiff could

successfully proceed against the defendants was on the basis of
vicarious liability because the defendants themselves had no
direct participation in the events wl1ich led to the fatality of
Evan Pearce.
At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence as to tne defendant's ownership of the boat.

")")

.

It was undisputed that r'"evin

Wistisen, at the time of the incident, was a minor and that he
had possession of and was operatin6 the boat with the express
consent of one of the owners, and with

th~

implied consent of the

other owner.
In order to instruct the jury as to that theory, the plaintiff requested the following instruction:
You are instructed that the law of the State
of Utah, Utan Code Ann. §73-18-18, provides
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as follows:
The owner of a vessel shall be
liable for any injury or dama~e
occasioned by the negligent operation of such vessel by a minor
under the age of eighteen years
operating such vessel with the
express or implied consent of the
owner, whether under the laws of
this State or by neglecting to
observe such ordinary care and such
operation as the rules of common
law require.
Therefore, if you find that Kevin L. Wistisen
was negligent in the operation of the boat,
either in regard to violation of one of the
laws of the State or by his failure to exercise
ordinary care, caution and prudence, and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of
the death of Evan Pearce, then you shall find
in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants.
1he trial court failed to give that instruction and the

~laintiff

made a timely objection to said failure.
The instructions 6iven by ti1e court which bear some relation to the liability of tt1e owners of the boat are contained in
Instructions Number 5 and 6.

(R. at 178-180.)

Instruction

Number 5 states only, "the plaintiff has the burden of persuadin6
you that the defendants Martin J. Wistisen and/or Richard Oveson
and/or the boat operator Kevin Wistisen was negligent [sic] . . . "
While Instruction Number 6 does indicate that the owners of a
boat are required to have it equipped

wit~

necessary safety

equipment, the instruction repeatedly refers to the responsibility of the operator to have that equipment and not the owners.
The instruction says nothing about any liability of the owners
for the neglj_gence of the minor operator of the boat.

The refer-

ence of the instruction to the duty of the owners to keep equip-
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ment on the boat was ineffective in view of the facts preseuted
at trial indicating that the minor son of tile defendant Wistisen
took what few safety equipment items were owned by the defendants out of the boat.
Utah Code Ann. §73-18-18 (1980), establishes the propriety
of the requested instruction number 6 as a matter of law.

The

failure to give the instruction, was error, in that, the only
impression that could be drawn by the jury was that the imputed
negligence of the onwers was not the law or the view of the
court.
In the case of Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah

1981), this court discussed the issue of the trial court's obligation to submit the theory of a party to the jury if there is
evidence adduced in

su~~ort

thereof.

In its

holdin~,

the court

stated as follows:
The well-recognized 6 eneral rule entitles a
party to have his theory of the case submitted
to the jury. Where there is evidence adduced
to support a party's theory of the case, it
is prejudicial error for the trial court to
fail to instruct th~reon.
With respect to vicarious liability, it was absolutely
essential that the instruction be given, at least in substance,
as requested by the plaintiff.

This is so, because there were

several acts of negligence by Kevin Wistisen which more directly
contributed to the fatality than others.

Unless the jury were to

know that the owners were responsible for all acts of nee,ligence
by Kevin Wistisen, the jury might, as they did in the present
case, find that any 11egligence of the named defendants was not a
proximate cause of the fatality in questio11.
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The principal acts of neglit:,ence by Kevin Wistisen were
removing the required safety equipment from the boat ?rior to the
excursion, causing the rope to become entan 0 led in the propeller
mechanixrn, and leavinc; the two t;irls in the boat completely
uninstructed in the operation thereof with the power 11avin6 been
disconnected.

These ne3ligent acts, singly or in combinatior1,

were the proximate cause of the death of the decedent, Evan
Pearce.

Because there was no instruction imputing liability for

these negligent acts to the named defendants, the jury was only
able to consider the named defendants' inde?endent negligence
which was found not to be the proximate cause of the injuries.
Unless the Court should find that other instructions presented
the plaintiff's theory in regard to vicarious liability, the
holding in the Watters case requires a findi11 0 that the failure
to give instruction number 6 was prejudical error and brounds for
reversal.
POli~T

II

THE PLAINTIFF WAS SUBTA.NTIALLY PREJUDICED HY TH.E El{KONt:OUS
ADMISSION OF EVIDENC~ COl~CERNI.NG ALCOHOL CON~UHPT IOH BY Ttl~

DECEASED, EVAN

PEA~CE.

Rule 4 of the Utah

~ules

of Evidence states the law concerninb

the erroneous admission of evidence:
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside,
nor shall the judgment or decision based
thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous
admission of evidence, unless (a) there
appears of record objection to the evidence
timely interposed and so stated as to make
clear the specific t;round of objection, and
(b) the court which passes upon the effect of
the error or errors is of the opinion that
the admitted evidence should have been excluded
on the grounds stated and probably had a
substantial influence in bringin~ about the
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verdict or finding.
However, the court in
its discretion, and in the interest of
justice, may review the erroneous admission
of evidence even though the grounds of th~
objection thereto are not correctly stated.
In the present case, the court erroneously allowed the
defendants to introduce two se~arate items of evidence which had
substantial influence in bringin 6 about the verdict of no cause
of action against the plaintiff.

Those two items of evidence

were testimony concerning the illegal purchase of an alcoholic
beverage by the plaintiff and testimony concernin 0

the plaintiff's

consumption of alcoholic beverages many hours prior to the events
which led to his death.

That testimony was given by Mr. Rod Hunt

who had accompanied the deceased on the evening and morning
preceding the eveing of the accident.

The plaintiff was not

aware of the identity of that witness until the Friday preceding
the Monday which commenced trial.

The plaintiff had no opportunity

to depose that witness or prepare adequately for cross-examinination.
Once the plaintiff discovered that the defendants intended
to introduce such evidence, the

~laintiff

made a motion in limi11e

to prevent the introduction of said evidence.

The motion in

limine was denied, and the _t>laintiff thereafter made timely and
specific objections to the admission of said evidence in the
course of the trial.

The objections presented by the plaintiff

in its motion and at trial were that the evidence was remote in
time, irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and constituted unfair
surprise.
Rule 1(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines "relevant
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evidence" as that evidence "havin<_; any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove the existence of any material fact."

'fhe

evidence concerning the purchase and consumption of the alcohol
by the deceased was irrelevar1t because it did not tend to prove
the only affirmative defense raised by the defendants

relatin~

to

contributory negligence.
Neglic;ence has been defined by this Court to mean "breach of
a duty to use due care under the circumstances of the situation."
~1eeler

v. Jones, 19 Utah 2d 392, 431 P.2d 9d5,

98~

(1967).

ln

order to be admissible, the evidence would have to tend to prove
that by reason of the consurnptj_on of alcohol, the decedent, £van
Pearce, was unable to exercise due care for his own safety.

The

defendants utterly failed to show any causal connection between
the purchase or consumption of alcohol and any lack of due care
for his own safety by the decedent.

Hr. Hunt was not present

during any of the eventd surrounding the water skiing excursion
in question and none of the other witnesses testified as to any
observable signs of drinkin 0 or intoxication on the

~art

of the

decedent.
Counsel for tae defendants was perfectly aware of his inability
to relate the drinkint;, to any reco 6 nizable standard or to actual
observable physical impairment.

This is indicated in the followinb

statement in chambers to the Court:
Now let me be totally candid and above board
with the Court.
I have talked with l~ewell
Knight, I have talked with the State Toxicologist, in an effort to try and determine the
amount of alcohol in this boy's system when
the accident occurred, based on the testimony
of Rod Hunt.
The truth of the matter is they
can't be very helpful unless the amount of
alcohol is more correctly 4uantified. And
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Rod Hunt cannot do it.
I believe, though,
Judge, that the jury has the right to know
what happened the night before, and even
though we don't have any scientific evidence
that might suggest the amount of alcohol in
the system, there is enough experience that
jurors would have that they could draw their
own conclusions.
(R. at 258.)

The court's response to Mr. Hansen's statement was,

"You are over estimating jurors in this county."

(R. at 258.)

The plaintiff respectfully submits that evidence concerning
the consumption of alcohol is irrelevant unless it can be related
to a specific blood alcohol level, intoxication or some observable effect of alcohol upon the person.

The defendants were

unprepared to present such causal relation, the court knew that
they would be unable to do so during the preliminary motion to
exclude the evidence and the defendants during the trial were
never able to show any causal connection between the evidence and
any negligence on the part of the plaintiff's decedent.

The jury

was simply left to draw such inferences as they might from the
illegal purchase and the consumption of some unknown quantity of
alcohol without any guidepost or reference point.

The only

effect of said evidence was to prejudice and inflame the jury.
It is well known that the predominant religion in Utah
County is the Latter-Day Saint Faith.

That faith categorically

proscribes the use of alcohol by its members and does it in such
a way as to equate it with sin and misconduct.

The ingrained

abhorrence of such midconduct by members of that faith is such as
to have easily prejudiced the jury against the plaintiff.

To

allow such testimony without any causal connection between the
use of alcohol on the evening before the accident and the drowning

-17-
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incident which claimed the life of Evan Pearce was to introduce
an inflammatory, prejudicial and indefensible proposition to the
jury.

The plaintiff had no way of countering such highly preju-

dicial testimony, and any effort to rebut such testimony would
simply serve to emphasize the point to the jury.
Every case which discusses the issue of the relevancy of
evidence of "intoxication" with respect to contributory negligence, refers to the legal term "intoxication'' or to a specific
blood alcohol content.

Plaintiff readily concedes that had the

defendants been able to show intoxication or some specific blood
alcohol level or even some observable signs of impairment, the
evidence would have been relevant and admissible.
It is not difficult to understand why there was no evidence
of observable impairment on the part of Evan Pearce in view of
the well known scientific fact that individuals eliminate alcohol
from the body at the rate of .015% of blood alcohol in the system
every hour.

This means that over a period of twelve hours, an

individual with a .18% blood alcohol level would eliminate all
alcohol from his body.
In Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 1117
(6th Cir. 1974), a railroad fireman was killed by a moving train
while working as an employee of the defendant.

The executrix of

the defendant's estate sought to recover for the death under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act.

During the trial the defen-

dants introduced evidence to the effect that plaintiff's decedent
had been drinking some time previous to the accident.

Plaintiff

maintained that the drinking was too remote in time and was
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therefore inadmissible.

In ruling on the admissibility of the

evidence that the decedent had been drinking the court held:
Clearly, testimony tending to show that the
decedent had been drinking before a fatal accident is generally relevant to the jury's consideration of contributory negligence • • • • Yet
the relevance of such evidence disappears
the drinking occurred so long before the accident
that the alcohol could no longer have any effect
on the decedent's conduct. The probative value of
such evidence must be closely scrutinized to avoid
the possibility of prejudice to the party charged
with negligence.
In this case particularly in
view of the testimony of appellee's expert Martin
that any alcohol consummed by the decedent in
Cincinnati on Thursday night and early Friday,
would not still be in his blood at the time of the
accident on Saturday evening, references to the
so-called Cincinnati drinking should not have been
received or should have been stricken. The same
is true with respect to the ambigious references
to Wild Turkey Bourbon. This evidence was much
too remote and uncertain to be of probative value
on this issue of contributory negligence.

rr-

502 F.2d at 1121 (Emphasis added).
The time frame in the instant case, is identical to that
described in the Bach case above and the denial of plaintiff's
motion in limine cannot be dismissed as harmless error as the
ruling in that case properly states as follows:
As the evidence is convincing that the decedent,
whether drunk or sober, was guilty of a high
degree of negligence in sitting on a rail, knowing that the train was soon to return, his head
down resting on his hands and knees oblivious of
this impending doom despite the-train's continuous
whistle and other sounds, can it be said that the
court errs in charging the Ohio Statute and in
admitting the challenged evidence of drinking were
harmless? We think not.
This is true primarily
because under the F.E.L.A. the issue was not
negligence alone but comparative negligence as
between the decedent and the railroad. • • • The
jury's responsiblity was to fix the degree of
negligence of each party. We are unable to say
that the erroneous rulings on the drinking issue
were simply innocuous and played no part in causing
-19-
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the jury to find the decednet 80% negligent
rather than say, 50% or 60% or some other
percentage less than 80% negligent.
502 F2d at 1121-1122.
Assuming arguendo that the evidence was relevant, there is a
further determination to be made as to its admissibility pursuant
to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which states as follows:
Except as in these rules otherwise provided,
the Judge may in his discretion exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the risk that
its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time, or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the
issues or of misleading the jury, or (c)
unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who
has not had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered.
The recent case of Terry v. Zions Co.-Op. Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), discusses in detail the application of the above cited evidentiary rule in cases such as that
presented to the Court.

In the Terry case, the trial court

limited the introduction of evidence of the plaintiff's prior
arrest and conviction for shop lifting.

The defendant argued

that since the plaintiff's claim was to the effect that the
subject matter detention and arrest caused her severe emotional
distress and damaged her reputation, it should be allowed to
present evidence concerning the nature and substance of the prior
conviction.

The trial court refused to allow such evidence and

in affirming the decision, this Court said:
Although the relevancy of the proffered
evidence is crucial, the probative value of
the evidence, standing alone, does not determine
its admissibility • • • This principle has
been codified in Rule 45, Utah Rules of
Evidence, • • • The trial judge effectuated
this protection by restricting the evidence
-20-
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admitted to the fact of the prior act and the
identity of the party involved.
In his
decision to exclude the substantive effects
of the incident, the trial judge took into
consideration the delay and confusion that
would result from a re-trial of the prior
conviction, the remoteness of the prior act,
and the tendency the proffered evidence would
have to mislead and prejudice the jury.
605 P.2d at 322 and 323 (emphasis added).
Concededly, the determination as to undue prejudice is one
to be made by the trial court in its discretion.

The facts of

the present case show that the trial court clearly abused its
discretion in allowing the admission of the evidence in question.
In analyzing the exercise of discretion by the court, it is
important to note that if the evidence concerning the consumption
of alcohol were not sufficient error by itself, the court allowed
the defendants to compound the error by presenting testimony over
objection that the alcohol had been illegally purchased by the
decedent.

It is axiomatic that such evidence is irrelevant and

could only relate to the decedent's bad character.

The only

purpose of such testimony is to influence and prejudice the jury.
The mischief of allowing such testimony is to introduce a
shadow defense for which the plaintiff cannot respond.

Analogous

to the circumstance is the Dead Man's Statute, Utah Code Ann.
§78-24-2(3)(1977), which would have prohibited this type of
testimony wherein the only rebutting testimony was possessed by
the decedent.

While the Dead Man's Statute is not in point as a

matter of subject, it is in point in regard to the spirit of the
law regarding fair play.
The result of the court's denial of plaintiff's motion in
limine was to allow the defendants to demean and besmirch the
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reputation of the decedent by implying that some significant orgy
had occurred the night before the accident, and that the decedent
was a participant.

The very nature of the testimony placed the

decedent among a class of people generally rejected in the philosophic view of the majority of the people in Utah County.

While

one does not know the religious and philosophic convictions of
the jury, in light of the religious demographics of the area from
which the jury was drawn, it is not hard to envision that all or
at least a significant portion of the jury subscribed to the
beliefs of the predominant religious denomination.
Based on the above-cited authority and analysis it is clear
that the court's admission of evidence regarding consumption of
alcohol by the decedent, Evan Pearce, was unduly prejudical and
reversible error.
POINT III
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 13 REGARDING THE PRESUMPTION THAT EVAN PEARCE
WAS EXERCISING DUE CARE FOR HIS OWN SAFETY WAS ERROR.
The instinct of self-preservation and the known disposition
of man to avoid injury and harm to himself are common knowledge.
Demille v. Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 159 (1969), Haman v.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 415 P.2d 305, 310 (Idaho
1966); Hooton v. City of Burley, 70 Idaho 369, 219 P.2d 651
(1950); Staab v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co., 23 Idaho 314,
129 P. 1078 (1913).

Based on said instincts a presumption arises

which the courts have presented to juries by way of instruction.
In Demille v. Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 159, 161
(1969), plaintiff maintained a wrongful death action against
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defendant as a result of a head-on collision on a highway.

In

ruling on the issue of the presumption that an individual exercises due care for his or her own safety, the Supreme Court of
Utah held:
There was a presumption, based upon the
instinct of self-preservation, that the
deceased, Spendlove, was exercising due care
for his own safety; this presumption may take
the place of evidence sufficient to make a
positive finding in the absence of other
evidence.
The court in Demille concluded that the presumption was
rebuttable upon the establishment of a prima f acia case by the
opposing party and that it is a question for the court whether
such prima facia case has been established.

462 P.2d at 161.

In the instant case it is impossible to conclude, based on
the record, that the defendants established a prima facia case
sufficient to rebut the presumption.

Testimony at trial indi-

cated that Evan Pearce made every effort to get back to the boat
after the rope became entangled in the propeller mechanism.
349-352, 366-369.)

(R.

Except while making a final effort to reach

the boat he wore a life jacket at all times.

He was neither

passive nor indifferent in his attempts to secure his own safety,
but rather, made all conceivable efforts in that regard.
In Harnan v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, ·415 P.2d
305, 310-311 (Idaho 1966), a life insurance beneficiary brought
an action against the insurer for the benefits of the policy.

In

holding that the lower court's jury instruction on presumption of
the decedents due care for his safety was proper, the Supreme
Court of Idaho stated:
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As to the evidentiary and procedural effect
of such presumption, this court has held the
presumption of due care creates a prima facia
case of due care upon the part of the person
killed. • • if insufficient evidence is
presented by the party against whom the
presumption operates, the presumption will
entitle the party relying on it to judgment.
The court in Harnan outlined the analysis to be followed
when evidence is presented contrary to the presumption:
In Department of Finance v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 61 Idaho 484, 104 P.2d 1110
(1940), it was held that if reasonable minds
might differ as to the conclusions to be
drawn from the evidence opposing the presumption
the matter should be submitted to the jury,
and the jury informed as to the presumption,
quoting from Geist v. Moore, 58 Idaho 149, 70
P.2d 403 (1937), as follows:
• • • and in the following cases
this court had definitely comitted
itself to the doctrine that where
there is a conflict between the
presumption and contrary evidence,
from which reasonable minds might
draw different conclusions, it is
proper to instruct the jury as to
the presumption.
415 P.2d at 311 (emphasis added).
The record in the instant case shows little, if any, evidence
indicating that Evan Pearce was not exercising due care for his
own safety.

In fact, the testimony on record indicates that he

was at the time of the emergency, endeavoring to secure his
safety and well being.

If the evidence was such that reasonable

minds might draw different conclusions, it was not only proper,
but also required that the instruction be given, together with
any necessary instructions concerning presumptions and rebuttal
of presumptions.
Based on the authority cited above, plaintiff was entitled
-24-
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to a jury instruction that he was exercising due care for his own
safety and the court's failure to so instruct was error.
POINT IV
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF AN ANCHOR ABOARD THE BOAT IN ISSUE ttAS
ERROR.
In Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 445 (Utah 1981), as discussed in Point I, the Utah Supreme Court held that where a party
introduces evidence in support of its theory of a case, that
party is entitled to have that theory submitted to the jury and
that failure by the court to submit the theory constitutes prejudicial error.
In the instant case, a portion of the plaintiff's theory of
the case was that an anchor on the boat in question was statutorily required.

The law is, in pertinent part:

"All vessels

except those capable of being safely beached shall be equipped
with an anchor and line of sufficient weight and length to
securely anchor such vessel."

Utah Code Ann., §73-18-8 (1980); 4

Utah Admin. R. §A60-01-3(3)(b)(l2) (1975).
The evidence introduced by plaintiff was by expert witnesses
at trial who indicated that during a wind storm on Utah Lake, a
boat of the size and type in question would not be beachable and
would, therefore, require an anchor on board to be in compliance
with Utah law.

(R. at 468.)

The absence of an anchor on board

was well documented by testimony at trial.

(R. at 38, 373-374,

407.)
Whether the law required an anchor to be aboard the boat
may, arguendo, be debatable depending on whether the boat is
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"beachable."

One expert, Mr. Larry Davis, said it was not, (R.

(R. at 627.)

at 468), and one expert, Mr. Tuttle, said it was.
Both, however, said an anchor was essential.

Furthermore, the

State of Utah, through its recreation department, had established
safety standards, the departure from which would be negligence.
Those standards were introduced into evidence and categorically
stated that for this boat an anchor was an essential piece of
safety equipment.

The failure to have one aboard was negligence,

especially in this case.
(R. at 442.)

The lake had a mean deapth of 9 feet.

An anchor with a rode (length) of 30 feet would

have been totally effective in preventing the drift of the boat
and would have saved the life of Evan Pearce.
Plaintiff maintains, as part of his theory of the case, that
under the conditions that prevailed on Utah Lake at the time of
the emergency, the lack of an anchor on board the boat constituted negligence on the part of the defendants.

Plaintiff sup-

ported his theory by evidence adduced at trial as required by the
general rule in Watters.

In view of the holding in Watters and

the evidence introduced at trial, plaintiff is entitled to have
his theory of the case submitted to the jury.

The court's fail-

ure to give such an instruction to the jury would cause the jury
to believe that the lack of an anchor was not a violation of law
and that the defendants were not negligent in that respect.
Apart from the statutory aspect discussed above, plaintiff
submits that rules and regulations promulgated by the State of
Utah, through the Division of Parks and Recreation, made it
essential that an anchor be on board the boat in question and
that pursuant to these rules and regulations the lack of an
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anchor is evidence of negligence by the defendants.
Plaintiff's requested Instruction Number 8 contained a list
of "essential" safety items as promulgated in a publication by
the State of Utah through its Division of Parks and Recreation.
(See Appendix A-1.)

This list of "essential" safety equipment

was allowed into evidence as Exhibit Number 7 without objection
from defendants.

Plaintiff maintains that this list constitutes

a safety standard, the deviation from which constitutes negligence.
In Wheeler v. Jones, 19 Utah 2d, 392, 431 P.2d 985 (1967),
the plaintiff sued for injuries which he had received as a result
of colliding with a glass sliding door owned and maintained by
defendants.

Plaintiffs were allowed to enter into evidence

F.H.A. regulations on the necessity of having either safety glass
or a horizontal metal bar in the door.

The Utah Supreme Court

allowed the evidence, holding that it was "one of the standards
of the community in determining whether or not the defendants were
negligent."

(Emphasis added).

The court in Wheeler continued by

stating:
While it is true that the ueight of authority
is against allowing regulations such as those
of F.H.A. to be given in evidence, yet there
is a respectable authority permitting such
evidence to be received.
[Citations omitted].
431 P.2d at 987.
In Sage v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, 380 P.2d 856
(Wash. 1963), the administratrix of decedent's estate maintained
a wrongful death action against defendants as a result of a
collision which claimed the decedent's life.

The Supreme Court

of Washington held that plaintiff was entitled to introduce as
evidence certain safety standards which were contained in a
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booklet promulgated by the National Safety Council.
A trend exists in the law which allows codes or standards of
safety issued or sponsored by governmental bodies to be admitted
into evidence on the issue of negligence.

As evidenced by the

decision in Wheeler, Utah is among the minority that allows such
codes and safety standards to be introduced into evidence.
Annot., 78 ALR 2d 778 §3(b)(l96l)(cases cited in, Later Case
Service 1975).
In the instant case, plaintiff established by introduction
of Exhibit 7, that safety regulations exist in the State of Utah
which would make an anchor an essential piece of equipment on
board the boat in question.

Based on the authority in Wheeler

and the safety standards promulgated by the Utah Division of
Parks and Recreation, the lack of an anchor on the boat in question was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants.
Plainiffs requested Instruction Number 8 6oncerned the
specific safety regulations promulgated by the Utah Division of
Parks and Recreation.

Since the safety equipment list was intro-

duced into evidence without objection, it was error for the court
not to give plaintiff's Instruction Number 8 in order to allow
the jury to properly evaluate the evidence.
The court's failure to give an appropriate instruction on
plaintiff's theory that an anchor was required aboard the boat
constitutes prejudicial error.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff proceeded in this action against the named defendants on the theory that, the defendants were vicariously liable
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for the negligence of Kevin Wistesen, a minor son of one of the
defendants.

Plaintiff presented this theory at trial, along with

evidence to support the theory.

Plaintiff was, therefore, entitled

to have an instruction given to the jury which would adequately
inform the jury of plaintiff's theory of the case. The Court
failed to give such an instruction on the imputed liability of
the defendants and such failure constituted prejudicial error.
The plaintiff was substantially prejudiced by the erroneous
admission of evidence inferring alcohol consumption by the
decedent, Evan Pearce.

The alleged consumption, if any, was

remote in time, totally irrelevant, without any probative value
and offered for the sole purpose to inflame and prejudice the
jury against the decedent, Evan Pearce.

Plaintiff made a motion

in limine with respect to such evidence, which motion the Court
denied.

Plaintiff also made timely objections when such evi-

dence was introduced at trial.

Defendants totally failed to

show that the deceased, Evan Pearce, at the time of the accident,
was intoxicated or otherwise influenced or debilitated from the
consumption of alcohol.

Defendants also conceded that they would

be unable to make such a showing based on the testimony they
would offer at trial.

To further compound the inadmissibility

and prejudicial effect of the evidence, defendants were allowed
to introduce evidence that the decedent, Evan Pearce, illegally
purchased the alcoholic beverages.
such evidence is inadmissible.

It goes without saying that

It was egregiously inflammatory

and was introduced only to demean and impugn the reputation of
the decedent in the eyes of the jurors.
-29-

The Court's failure to
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grant plaintiff's motion in limine was prejudical error and
grounds for reversal.
Utah case law establishes the presumption that a person
exercises due care for his or her own safety.

This presumption

should be presented to the jury in the form of an instruction
even if the other party presents evidence which runs contra to
the presumption as long as reasonable minds might differ as to
the conclusions to be drawn from such evidence.

In the instant

case, the evidence offers every indication that the decedent,
Evan Pearce, made very conceivable effort and exercised all due
care to secure his own safety.

The Court did not give either

plaintiff's requested instruction on the presumption or an equivalent instruction.

The Court's failure to so instruct the jury

constituted error.
Plaintiff presented evidence in support of the theory, that
Utah law required an anchor to be aboard the boat in question.
Plaintiff also presented evidence that the State of Utah, through
its Division of Parks and Recreation, has promulgated and published rules and regulations which make an anchor an essential
item of safety equipment on a boat such as the one in question.
Plaintiff submits that the lack of an anchor on board the defendants' boat was a departure from these rules and regulations and
as such, was evidence of negligence.

Again, plaintiff maintains

that he was entitled to have his theory submitted to the jury and
the failure of the Court to instruct the jury in that theory

+L,

constitutes prejudicial error.
Respectfully submitted this

(2._

day of July, 1982.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that the State of Utah, through its
Division of Parks & Recreation, .has approved a list of essential
That list is as follows:

equipment for safe boating.
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You may use the above developed list for the purpose of
determining whether the boat, which is involved in this litigation, was· properly equipped for safe operation, and whether in
your opinion, the failure to have any of said equipment on the
boat was the proximate cause of the death of Evan Pearce.
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